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Abstract Online social networks expose their users to privacy leakage risks.
To measure the risk, privacy scores can be computed to quantify the users’ pro-
file exposure according to their privacy preferences or attitude. However, user
privacy can be also influenced by external factors (e.g., the relative risk of the
network, the position of the user within the social graph), but state-of-the-art
scores do not consider such properties adequately. We define a network-aware
privacy score that improve the measurement of user privacy risk according
to the characteristics of the network. We assume that users that lie in an
unsafe portion of the network are more at risk than users that are mostly
surrounded by privacy-aware friends. The effectiveness of our measure is an-
alyzed by means of extensive experiments on two simulated networks and a
large graph of real social network users.
Keywords privacy measures · online social networks · centrality · simulation ·
computational social science
1 Introduction
Online social networks are permeating most aspects of our life. More than
two billions active social accounts are producing petabytes of behavioral and
interaction data daily. At the same time, the famous “six degrees of separation”
theory has been far exceed in Facebook, where an average degree of 3.57 has
been recently observed1. This massive interconnection intrinsically exposes
social network users to the risk of privacy leakage.
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If, from one hand, many users are informed about the risks linked to the
disclosure of sensitive information (private life events, sexual preferences, dis-
eases, political ideas, among others), on the other hand the awareness of being
exposed to privacy breaches each time we disclose information that apparently
is not sensitive is still insufficiently widespread. In this regard, daily activities
may reveal information that can be used by others in a negative manner. For
example, a GPS tag far from home or pictures taken during a journey may
alert potential burglars, or the disclosure of family relationships may expose
our own or other family members’ privacy to criminal offence risks, as well
as source of tort liability. Most troubling of all, it has been shown that by
leveraging Facebook user’s activity it is possible to infer some very private
traits of the user’s personality (Kosinski et al., 2013). This inference capabil-
ity has been recently exploited to help propel Donald Trump to victory in the
last U.S. presidential elections (Gonza´lez, 2017) and was at the very center of
the Facebook–Cambridge Analytica scandal in early 2018. This privacy breach
event has multiplied the interests in the protection of human dignity and per-
sonal data, and privacy has become a primary concern among social network
providers and web/data scientists.
Although social platforms often provide some kind of notification intended
to inform their users about the risks of private information disclosure, many
people simply overlook the dangers due to the uncontrolled disclosure of their
(and others’) personal data. Therefore, following the recent scandals, most so-
cial media have considerably improved their tools for controlling the privacy
settings of the user profile (e.g., Instagram can now limits the visibility of
stories to “close-friend”), but such tools are often hidden and not that user-
friendly. Consequently, they are barely utilized by most users. Recent machine
learning and data mining studies try to go beyond these limitations by propos-
ing some measures of users’ profile privacy based on the way they customize
their privacy settings (Liu and Terzi, 2010; Wang et al., 2014), or lightening
the customization process of the privacy settings by means of guided tools
and wizards (Fang and LeFevre, 2010; Song et al., 2018). Privacy measures
(Wagner and Eckhoff, 2018), in particular, when associated to popup alerts or
other visual components (e.g., gauges or discharging batteries (Talukder et al.,
2010)), may enhance user’s perception of privacy, according to the principles
of Privacy by Design specifications (Cavoukian, 2012).
However, the privacy measures proposed so far (Liu and Terzi, 2010; Wang
et al., 2014) have a strong limitation. In fact, the privacy risk is not just a mat-
ter of users’ preferences (i.e. to which friends a user is wishing to disclose each
particular action/post); it is also heavily affected by the characteristics of the
social network they belong to., i.e., their centrality within the network and the
attitude of their friends towards privacy. According to a recent computational
science study (Bioglio and Pensa, 2017), even restraining privacy settings are
ineffective when the user is located within an unsafe network, i.e., a network
where the majority of nodes have little or no awareness about their own and
others’ privacy. When a user posts something private or sensitive in a subnet-
work where the majority of individuals are aware about their own and others’
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privacy, the risk that her sensitive information spread in the network is low
(this condition is similar to a very well-known phenomenon in epidemiology,
called herd immunity). Hence, her privacy risk is lower than the risk of a user
posting something private in a network where many individuals are not aware
about their own or others’ privacy. In the latter case, a “like” or a comment
under the post in question may trigger the diffusion of private information in
the network. Malicious users may leverage this information to cheat or commit
some evil acts against the author of the post at issue. To explain the influence
of the network on user privacy, let us consider two examples.
Example 1 Two users u1 and u2 share the same attitude to their own privacy
protection. However, user u1 occupies a central position within the social net-
work (her centrality is high (Newman, 2010)), while u2 is a peripheral user
(her centrality is low). According to these hypotheses, user u1 should be more
exposed to privacy leakage than u2, since u1’s posts have more chance of being
diffused than u2’s posts.
Example 2 Two users u1 and u2 have exactly the same attitude towards the
protection of their own privacy. However, user u1 is mostly connected to friends
that do not care that much about their own privacy leakage, while u2 is prin-
cipally surrounded by friends that, instead, care about their own (and others’)
privacy. According to these hypotheses, user u1 has higher probability of be-
ing exposed to privacy leakage than u1. Roughly speaking, there will be some
portions of the social network that are weaker than others from the point of
view of privacy leakage.
These sample scenarios lead to the intuition that privacy risk in a social
network may be modeled similarly as page authority in a hyperlink graph of
web pages. According to a well-known theory (Brin and Page, 1998), more
authoritative web sites are likely to receive more links from other web sites
that are authoritative in their turn. In this paper, we make the hypothesis
that the concept of “importance” of a web-page can be transposed into the
concept of “privacy risk” of users in a social network as follows: the more an
individual is surrounded by friends that are careless about their privacy, the
more the privacy of that individual is likely to be exposed to concrete privacy
leakage risks.
With the goal of helping users’ enhance their privacy awareness in their cy-
bersocial world, in this paper we propose a new network-aware computational
method for measuring the privacy risk, inspired by personalized Pagerank
(Jeh and Widom, 2003), one of the best known algorithms to rank web pages
according to a personalized view of their authority (or importance). Further-
more, with the aim of supporting our claims, we report on a social experiment
we performed, which involves more than one hundred Facebook users. Thus,
our approach is validated on a sample which is unusually large for this type
of experiments (Furini and Tamanini, 2015). Thanks to this experiment, we
show the effectiveness of our privacy measure not only on two simulated net-
works but also on a large network of real Facebook users. Additionally, these
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experiments also allow us to infer a practical estimate of the intrinsic risk
due to the user attitude towards privacy (i.e., the risk due principally to the
users’ willingness to disclose their own personal data to other users) using the
information carried out by the social graph as an alternative to state-of-the-
art policy-based privacy scores (Liu and Terzi, 2010; Wang et al., 2014). Our
risk estimation is inferred from the privacy attitude computed for a group of
real Facebook users and, additionally, lends itself to an intuitive interpretation
based on common social network user experience.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows: i) we
propose a centrality-driven privacy score that takes into account the level of
privacy awareness of the subnetwork when estimating the privacy risk of each
individual user; ii) starting from a survey conducted on real Facebook users,
we identify a practical estimator of the intrinsic privacy risk of each user; iii)
we show experimentally that our privacy score captures a more reasonable risk
of privacy disclosure and leakage in realistic social networks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: we briefly review the
related literature in Section 2; the network-aware privacy score and the in-
trinsic risk computation are presented in Section 3; Section 4 provides the
details and results of our experimental study; finally, in Section 5, we draw
some conclusions, discussing both limitations and strengths of our approach,
and propose some future research directions.
2 Related work
The increasing success of online social networks in early 2010’s has also soon
highlighted their weaknesses, so that more and more research efforts have
been devoted to study privacy protection methods for social profiles. Most
research works focus on three main strategies: i) using data anonymization
and obfuscation techniques to preserve the identity of social network users;
ii) designing privacy protection mechanisms involving access control rules and
policy definition; iii) measuring the privacy level of users to provide them with
a practical means to assess their actual risk.
Identity disclosure protection. In privacy and social network analysis, most
research interests have been focused on the identification and formalization of
different privacy breaches and on the anonymization of identities in networked
data (Rathore et al., 2017). This goal is achieved by modifying the social graph
so as to minimize the probability of identifying an individual within the net-
work, by either anonymizing only the network structure or anonymizing both
network structure and user attributes (Zheleva and Getoor, 2011). The most
relevant contributions address the problem of graph anonymization by apply-
ing edge generalization (Hay et al., 2008; Cormode et al., 2009), randomization
(Ying and Wu, 2011; Vuokko and Terzi, 2010), modification (Zou et al., 2009;
Liu and Terzi, 2008; Zhou and Pei, 2011), or differentially private mechanisms
(Hay et al., 2009; Task and Clifton, 2012). The problem of identity disclosure
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leveraging user activity in online social networks has been explored as well:
Buccafurri et al. (2016), for instance, propose a cryptographic method to pro-
tect the identity of the individuals performing “like” actions on social media.
All these research works are only marginally related to ours.
Access control and policy definition. Although it is well established that user
privacy protection in social media involve multiple complex factors (Litt,
2013), the existing privacy controls for online social networking sites are barely
utilized in practice, since they are not fully socially aware (Misra and Such,
2016). This statement is confirmed by (Liu et al., 2011), who show that 36%
of Facebook content is shared without modifying the default privacy settings
and, consequently, it is exposed to more users than expected. Privacy fatigue,
(i.e., the tendency of online users to disclose greater information over time
due to increasingly complex and less usable privacy controls) is another fac-
tor that has been recognized to play a significant role in favoring behaviors
which endanger information privacy (Choi et al., 2018). Thus, many research
efforts aim at supporting people to recognize and prevent privacy issues in so-
cial media. Squicciarini et al. (2014) propose an ontology-based mechanism for
privacy protection, which supports semi-automated generation of access rules
for users’ profile items. Fang and LeFevre (2010), instead, propose a prototype
of social networking wizard leveraging active learning. Their tool build a clas-
sification model of a user’s friends based on their profile to assign them access
privileges on the user’s profile items. The model is improved incrementally
by asking the user to allow or deny the visibility of profile items to friends
selected according to an uncertainty sampling criterion. More recently, Song
et al. (2018) have proposed a taxonomy-guided learning model that predicts
which personal aspects are uncovered by the posts and constructs standard
guidelines to regularize users’ actions for preventing their privacy leakage. Such
and Rovatsos (2016) and Such and Criado (2016) suggest to negotiate (and
possibly merge) conflicting privacy preferences of multiple users on any indi-
vidual item by using a computational mechanism. Other very recent works
focus on recommendation of privacy settings for images representing sensitive
content (Yu et al., 2017) and on solving possible privacy leakage conflicts in
photos containing individuals others than the user who posted them (Xu et al.,
2017). Finally, in Pensa and Blasi (2017), the authors propose a profile control
framework to adjust personal privacy settings according to a measured risk of
leakage.
Tools and metrics for privacy assessment. In most cases, disclosing informa-
tion on the web is the result of a voluntary activity. Hence, a common opinion
is that users should care about their privacy during their interaction with
other social network users. Thus, the problem of measuring and improving
risk perception has gained popularity among researchers. Cetto et al. (2014),
for instance, present an online game that allows Facebook users to test their
knowledge of the visibility of their actual shared personal items and provides
them with some recommendations aimed at improving their privacy settings.
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Akcora et al. (2012a,b) propose a measure that quantify of how much it might
be risky to have interactions with friends, in terms of disclosure of private
information. As Fang and LeFevre (2010), they also use an active learning
approach to estimate user risk from few required user interactions. The au-
thors Talukder et al. (2010) present a privacy protection tool that measures
the inference probability of sensitive attributes from friendship links. In addi-
tion, they suggest self-sanitization actions to regulate the amount of leakage.
Becker and Chen (2009) show that a majority of users’ personal attributes
can be inferred from social circles and present a tool to detect unintentional
information loss in online social networks by quantifying the privacy risk at-
tributed to friend relationships in Facebook. Privacy metrics, whose goal is to
measure the degree of privacy enjoyed by users in a system and the amount
of protection offered by privacy-enhancing technologies (Wagner and Eckhoff,
2018), have attracted the interest of several important studies. Liu and Terzi
(2010), for instance, propose a framework to compute a privacy score measur-
ing the user’s potential privacy risk. This score increases with the sensitivity of
information items and their visibility, e.g., the number of users knowing about
each item, and leverages the item response theory (Keller and Schweid, 2011)
as theoretical basis for the mathematical formulation of the score. Similarly,
Wang et al. (2014) measure the user privacy exposure in a social network
using a privacy index. Differently from Liu and Terzi (2010), however, this
index requires predefined sensitivity values for users’ items and requires the
availability of user privacy settings. Several privacy scores are also proposed
in a recent social network simulation game designed to help teachers educate
school children on privacy issues (Bioglio et al., 2018). However, these scores
are intended as a reward mechanism, rather than risk assessment measures.
The positioning of our work is, in fact, in the last branch of research.
However, differently from the above mentioned papers, our proposal takes into
account the context of the user subnetwork. In detail, we propose a privacy
score that, compared to those presented in the closest related works (Liu and
Terzi, 2010; Wang et al., 2014), takes into account the privacy attitude of the
network as well as the centrality of the user.
3 Computing privacy scores
When measuring users’ privacy in online social network, their preferences are
only one side of the coin; in fact, user leakage risk is also affected by the context
in which an individual is immersed. Besides users’ own attitude on disclosing
very private facts, the attitude of their friends towards privacy plays an im-
portant role too: users that likes or share friends’ posts more often than the
others, contribute most to the rapid spread of information (Bioglio and Pensa,
2017). Another factor influencing users risk is constituted by their position
within the network (marginal users are certainly less exposed than very cen-
tral users). In this section we present a score that quantify the privacy leakage
of users considering the risks due not only to their attitude towards privacy
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(a) Aware node in an unaware network (b) Unaware node in an aware network
(c) Contex-aware privacy scores for net-
work (a)
(d) Contex-aware privacy scores for net-
work (b)
Fig. 1: Privacy risk and network-aware privacy score in two differently aware
networks.
but also to the attitude of their subnetwork. Before addressing the technical
details of our proposal and formalize the problem, we briefly introduce some
basic necessary mathematical notation.
We consider a set of n users participating in a social network, here repre-
sented as a directed graph G(V,E), where V is a set of n vertices {v1, . . . , vn}
such that each vertex vi ∈ V represents a user and E is a set of directed
edges E = {(vi, vj)}. Given a pair of users vi, vj ∈ V , (vi, vj) ∈ E iif there
exists a link from vi to vj (e.g., users vj is in the friend list/circle of vi or
vi follows vj). Each user is characterized by an intrinsic privacy risk ρp(vi),
which is defined as the user propensity to privacy leakage. Two examples of
social graphs with two different privacy risk values are given in Figure 1(a)
and 1(b). The assumption is that some users are more prone to disclose their
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personal data than others. This propensity is reflected in the way users con-
figure their privacy settings. In the following, we first provide the definition of
our network-aware privacy score independently from the specific choice of a
reliable intrinsic privacy risk measure. Then, we instantiate ρp(vi) according
to an established and reliable definition of privacy score (Liu and Terzi, 2010).
3.1 Network-aware privacy score
By definition, the intrinsic privacy risk ρp(vi) does not consider the context in
which an individual is immersed. However, the actual privacy leakage risk of
users is crucially affected by the properties of the social network they belong
to: two users sharing the same attitude towards their own privacy protection
are not necessarily subject to the same risk. If a user is mostly surrounded by
friends that do not care that much about privacy, then she should be more
exposed to privacy leakage than a user who is principally connected to friends
that care about their own (and others’) privacy. This consideration leads to the
intuition that privacy risk in a social network may be modeled similarly as page
authority in a hyperlink graph of web pages. Hence, we transpose the concept
of “importance” of a web-page into the concept of “privacy risk” of users in a
social network as follows: the more an individual is surrounded by friends that
are careless about their privacy, the less the individual her/himself is likely
to be protected from privacy leakage. One of the most popular algorithms
to rank web pages based on their centrality (or authority) is Pagerank (Brin
and Page, 1998). For a given directed graph G(V,E), where V is a set of n
vertices {v1, . . . , vn} and E is a set of directed edges E = {(vi, vj)}, Pagerank
is defined as the distribution that satisfies:
P = dA>P +
(1− d)
n
1 (1)
where P = [p(v1), . . . , p(vn)]
>
is the Pagerank vector (p(vi) being the Pager-
ank associated to vertex vi), d = [0, 1] is the damping factor (the 1−d quantity
is also known as restart probability), 1 is a vector of n ones, and A is a n× n
matrix such that each element aij = 1/deg
+(vi) (deg
+(vi) being the outdegree
of vi) if (vi, vj) ∈ E (aij = 0 otherwise).
The computation of Pagerank values can be done using the well known
power iteration method (Golub and van der Vorst, 2000), whose complexity
is O(I × |E|), I being the number of iterations (Bianchini et al., 2005). The
algorithm is reported to converge quickly even for graphs containing millions
of nodes (Brin and Page, 1998), thus the effective complexity is linear in the
number of edges. Nevertheless, many research efforts have been devoted to
speeding-up Pagerank computation (Chen et al., 2004; Kamvar et al., 2003;
McSherry, 2005).
In our specific problem, each user vi ∈ V has an associated intrinsic privacy
score ρp(vi). Consequently, instead of considering a uniform constant vector
for the computation of Pagerank, we will use a non-uniform vector where the
Network-aware Privacy Risk Estimation in Online Social Networks 9
component corresponding to node vi is equal to ρp(vi)/
∑n
k=1 ρp(vk). This
setting is similar to the definition of personalized Pagerank (Jeh and Widom,
2003), used to create a personalized view of the relative importance of the
nodes. We can now introduce our network-aware privacy score (called NetP-
Score), defined by the following distribution:
P = dA>P +
(1− d)∑n
k=1 ρp(vk)
ρ (2)
where ρ = [ρp(v1), . . . , ρp(vn)]
>
.
In those settings where the link between two users is always reciprocal (if
there is a link from vi to vj then there is also a link from vj to vi), the social
network is represented as an undirected graph G(V,E), where E is such that if
(vi, vj) ∈ E, then (vj , vi) ∈ E. In this case, A is symmetric and each element
aij = aji = 1/deg(vi) (deg(vi) being the degree of vi) if (vi, vj) ∈ E (aij = 0
otherwise).
Equation 2 provides a set of values that are not necessarily in the same
scale as the intrinsic risk. Hence, the final values of the privacy score, namely
NetP-Score(vi), requires the execution of the following re-scaling operation:
NetP-Score(vi) = p(vi) · range(ρp)
range(p)
(3)
where p(vi) is the network-aware privacy score value for node vi and NetP-Score(vi)
denotes the recomputed privacy score value. Moreover, range(ρp) = max{ρp(vj)}−
min{ρp(vj)}, range(p) = max{p(vj)}−min{p(vj)} are the overall range of the
values of the intrinsic risk and of the network-aware score respectively. In prac-
tice, the network-aware privacy score is adjusted so as to have the same range
as the intrinsic risk.
An example of network-aware score computation is given in Figure 1. In
Figure 1(a), we provide an example of graph where an aware user (the cen-
tral one) is surrounded by unaware users (i.e., users with high intrinsic risk).
Figure 1(c) represents the same network with the computed NetP-Scores: the
score value of the central user is adjusted according to the network and it
is sensibly higher than in Figure 1(a). Instead, in Figure 1(b), we provide
a network with the same topology but different intrinsic risks. In particular
the unaware central user (with high risk) is surrounded by rather aware users
(with low privacy risk). In this case, our measure for the central user is revised
downward (see Figure 1(d)), according to a context in which all other users
form a kind of barrier protecting the privacy of the central users. In this little
toy example we use an intermediate damping factor value (d = 0.5).
3.1.1 Choice of a reliable damping factor
The choice of damping factor d is not trivial in our setting. A common assump-
tion in information retrieval is that d should be set to 0.85 (Brin and Page,
1998), which gives much more importance to inbound links. However, in our
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User Age Job Politics
u1 2 2 0
u2 3 2 1
u3 3 3 1
u4 4 4 4
(a) A sample response matrix R
User ρp(Age) ρp(Job) ρp(Politics) ρp
u1 0.0556 0.2222 0.0000 0.2778
u2 0.3611 0.3194 0.1111 0.7917
u3 0.6667 0.4167 0.1111 1.1944
u4 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 3.0000
(b) Intrinsic privacy risks for the response matrix R
Fig. 2: A response matrix of a small set of users and topics (left) and the
resulting intrinsic privacy risk (right).
case, this may depend on the particular type of social network involved. For
instance, some social networking platforms heavily promote sharing actions.
In this case a high value of d may provide a better estimate of the real pri-
vacy risk for users that, despite their restrictive privacy settings, are located
in a relatively unsafe subnetwork. On the contrary, in those scenarios where
sharing actions of users are not that visible to other users, small values of d
provide more realistic privacy leakage estimates.
3.2 Policy-based intrinsic privacy risk
We have defined the intrinsic privacy risk as the user propensity to privacy
leakage. Assuming that users’ activity in a social network is known, measuring
their intrinsic privacy risk is not trivial. Our choice is based on the privacy
score defined by Liu and Terzi (2010). Each user in V may disclose information
related to a set of m topics T = {t1, . . . , tm}, corresponding, for instance, to
personal aspects such as religion, workplace, political views, health status,
birthplace, gender, age, vacations and so on2. An n ×m response matrix R
is associated to the set of n users V and the set of m topics T . Each element
rij of R corresponds to a privacy degree encoding the willingness of user vi to
make information associated with topic tj visible to other social network users.
Here we adopt the multinomial case, where entries in R take any non-negative
integer values in {0, 1, . . . , `}, where rij = h (with h ∈ {0, 1, . . . , `}) means
that user vi discloses information related to topic tj to users that are at most
h links away in the social network G (e.g., if rij = 0 user ui wants to keep
information about tj private, if rij = 1 user vi is willing to make information
related to tj available to all friends, if rij = 2 user vi is willing to let the friends
of her or his friends access information about tj , and so on). An example of
response matrix for four users and three topics is given in Figure 2(a).
Thanks to the response matrix R, the two main components of the pri-
vacy score can be computed, namely, the sensitivity σj of a topic tj , and the
visibility υij of a topic tj due to vi. Liu and Terzi (2010) use a mathematical
model based on polytomous item response theory (a well known theory in psy-
2 In this work, we refer to T as a fixed set of user-decided topics/aspects. It is out of
the scope of this paper to consider automatic topic/aspect inference of each user’s action or
posted item.
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chometrics, (Keller and Schweid, 2011)) to compute sensitivity and visibility.
Differently from Liu and Terzi (2010), we adopt a simpler but still effective
formulation that, additionally, is computationally less expensive.
According to this formulation, for any visibility degree h = {1, . . . , `− 1},
sensitivity is calculated as follows:
σjh =
1
2
(
n−∑ni=1 1(rij≥h)
n
+
n−∑ni=1 1(rij≥h+1)
n
)
(4)
where 1A is the function returning 1 when condition A is true and 0 when A
is false. When h equals one of the two extreme values (h = 0 or h = `), the
sensitivity values are computed differently. In detail,
σj0 =
n−∑ni=1 1(rij≥1)
n
(5)
for h = 0, and
σj` =
n−∑ni=1 1(rij≥`)
n
(6)
when h = `.
Equations 4, 5 and 6 have the following meaning: the less users adopt at
least privacy degree h for topic tj , the more sensitive tj is w.r.t. degree h.
Instead, when h takes intermediate values (i.e., h = {1, . . . , `− 1}), sensitivity
is computed according to both degrees h and h + 1. This guarantees that
σj0 < σj1 < . . . < σj`.
Example 3 (Sensitivity computation) Given the response matrix depicted in
Figure 2(a) and ` = 4, the sensitivity values for the topic Job are computed
as follows:
– σJob0 =
4−4
4 = 0 (all users have set the visibility level to at least 1),
– σJob1 =
1
2
(
4−4
4 +
4−4
4
)
= 0 (all users have set the visibility to at least 2),
– σJob2 =
1
2
(
4−4
4 +
4−2
4
)
= 14 (only users u3 and u4 have set the visibility
level to at least 3),
– σJob3 =
1
2
(
4−2
4 +
4−1
4
)
= 58 (only users u3 and u4 have set the visibility
level to at least 3, and u4 is the only user having set the visibility to 4),
– σJob4 =
4−1
4 =
3
4 (u4 is the only user having set the visibility level to 4).
In the simplified formulation, the visibility, for any degree h = {0, . . . , `}
is calculated as follows:
υijh = Pr(rij = h)× h (7)
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where Pr(rij = h) is the probability that rij equals h. Under the assumption
that topics and users are mutually independent, probability Pr(rij = h) can
be computed using the following formula:
Pr(rij = h) =
∑n
i=1 1(rij=h)
n
×
∑m
j=1 1(rij=h)
m
(8)
The intuitive interpretation of Equation 7 is that visibility υijh is higher when
the sensitivity of topic tj is low and user vj has a low attitude towards her
own privacy protection, regardless of the topic.
Example 4 (Visibility computation) Given the response matrix depicted in
Figure 2(a) and ` = 4, the visibility values υ2Jobh for the topic Job and user
u2 are computed as follows:
– υ2Job0 =
0
4 · 03 · 0 = 0,
– υ2Job1 =
0
4 · 13 · 1 = 0,
– υ2Job2 =
2
4 · 13 · 2 = 13 ,
– υ2Job3 =
1
4 · 13 · 3 = 14 ,
– υ2Job4 =
1
4 · 03 · 4 = 0.
To compute the intrinsic privacy risk ρp(vi, tj) for a given user vi and a
given topic tj , we use the following formula:
ρp(vi, tj) =
ρp(vi, tj)
max
vk∈V
ρp(vk, tj)
(9)
where
ρp(vi, tj) =
∑`
h=0
σjh × υijh. (10)
and max
vk∈V
ρp(vk, tj) is the maximum value of Equation 10 among all users.
Although normalization is not strictly required, we use it to unify the scale of
the intrinsic risk.
Finally, the overall intrinsic privacy risk ρp(vi) for any given user vi can
be computed as follows:
ρp(vi) =
m∑
j=1
ρp(vi, tj). (11)
The intuitive interpretation of Equation 9, 10 and 11 is as follows: ρp(vi) = 0
means that either the topic tj is not sensitive at all (i.e., in each element of
the summation, σjh = 0), or the information on topic tj is kept private (i.e.,
in each element of the summation, υijh = 0). Conversely, the privacy risk is
maximum when a user vi makes all sensitive information (σjh = 1) visible
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to all her or his friends (υijh = 1). As a consequence, users that have the
tendency to make information about sensitive topics visible to a larger public
are more susceptible to privacy leakage.
Example 5 (Intrinsic risk computation) Given the response matrix depicted
in Figure 2(a) and ` = 4, the (non normalized) intrinsic risk ρp(u2, Job) for
the topic Job and user u2 is computed as follows:
ρp(u2, Job) = 0 · 0 + 0 · 0 + 1
4
· 1
3
+
5
8
· 1
4
+
3
4
· 0 = 0.2396.
The values of the intrinsic privacy risk for all users and topics is given in Fig-
ure 2(b), together with the overall intrinsic privacy risks (rightmost column).
3.3 Theoretical complexity
Here we investigate the theoretical time complexity for computing our network-
aware privacy score in realistic scenarios. Let n be the total number of users
in the social network and m the overall number of topics. Computing the
response matrix R requires O(n ×m) operation. Hence, the computation of
the intrinsic privacy risk for all users requires O(n × m × `) operations for
obtaining all sensitivity values σjh (` being the overall number of visibility
degrees in R), the same cost for obtaining all visibility values υijh as well
as the final value of the risk. The overall time complexity for computing the
privacy risk values for all users and topics is then in O(n×m× `). However,
it is straightforward to suppose that, in a real-world scenario, ` << m and
m << n. According to these realistic assumptions, n dominates all other terms
and the overall time complexity of the intrinsic privacy risk computation is in
O(n). We recall that the power iteration method, needed to compute the values
of the network-aware privacy score requires O(I × |E|) operations (where I is
the number of iterations and |E| is the total number of edges in the network).
We can easily assume that n << |E| (for instance, the number of edges in
the Facebook social network is 95 times the number of nodes (Ugander et al.,
2011), although, according to a more recent survey3, the ratio is even larger)
and I << |E| (Brin and Page, 1998), so we conclude that the overall time
complexity for computing all network-aware privacy score in a social network
with |E| friendship links is in O(|E|).
4 Experimental results
In this section we report and discuss the results of the experiments that we con-
ducted on two simulated networks and a Facebook graph generated from the
ego-networks of real Facebook users. The main objectives of our experiments
are: i) to analyze the relationship between users’ attitude towards privacy
3 http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/03/6-new-facts-about-facebook/
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Fig. 3: Demographic statistics of the volunteers that participated in our online
experiment. In the graph concerning education, ND stands for “No diploma”,
HS stands for “High school”, UNI for “University/College degree”, and PHD
for “Ph.D. or other postgraduate degree”. In the graph representing job posi-
tions, UN stands for “Unemployed”, STU for “Student”, TEACH for “Profes-
sor/Teacher/Researcher”, MAN for “Manager/Professional”, and RE stands
for “Retired”. The y-axis represents the number of respondents.
self-protection and the value of the network-aware privacy score; ii) to show
the relationship between users’ privacy score and their centrality in the social
network; iii) to study the relationship between the scores and the effects of
information propagation in the network.
The section is organized as follows: first, we describe the data and how we
gathered them; then we analyze the behavior of our network-aware privacy
score; finally, we study the relationships between information propagation and
users’ privacy. All experiments are performed on a server equipped with 2 Intel
Xeon E5-2643 quad-core CPU’s, 128GB RAM, running Arch Linux (kernel
release: 4.5.1).
4.1 Datasets
In our experiments we use two simulated networks and a snapshot of the
Facebook graph consisting on the ego-networks of real Facebook users. The
two simulated networks (SN10K and SN50K) are generated using LDBC–
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Fig. 4: Degree distribution in the three networks
SNB Data Generator4 which produces graphs that mimic the characteristics
of real social networks (Erling et al., 2015). The two graphs have 10,000 and
50,000 nodes respectively and are generated using the default configuration
which tries to model the degree distribution as that observed in Facebook.
The third network (FB75K) is a snapshot of the real Facebook graph
that has been generated leveraging an online experiment. This experiment
was conducted as follows. We promoted an online experiment aimed at ob-
taining the required data to infer an approximate distribution of the privacy
risk depending on the node degree. The online experiment was conducted in
two phases. In the first phase we promoted the web page of the experiment5
where people could voluntarily grant us access to their friends network. The
participants were perfectly aware about the data we asked for and the purpose
of our experiment. Moreover, all data were collected, stored and processed ac-
cording to all EU regulations in force at the time6. In this first phase, data
were gathered through version 1.0 of Facebook Graph API, used in a Facebook
application written in Java. During spring 2015, we collected the anonymous
ego-networks of 185 volunteers. We also asked them for some demographic
data. From the related statistics reported in Figure 3 it turns out that there
is not an emergent category of participants, even though, in general, they are
highly-educated. The social network of all participants plus their friends con-
sists of 75,193 nodes and 1,377,672 edges. Although the overall social network
has been obtained by merging the participants’ anonymous ego networks, the
largest connected component contains 73,050 nodes (i.e., 97.15% of the overall
social graph) and 1,333,276 edges (i.e., 96.78% of the number of edges in the
overall graph). To achieve this goal, we foster the virality or our Facebook
application by allowing it to propose the publication of a special post inviting
all the participants’ friends to join the experiment. Note that, once collected,
the nodes identities were entirely replaced by anonymous IDs.
Some network statistics (number of edges and nodes, average clustering
coefficient, average degree) about the datasets are reported in Table 1, while
4 https://github.com/ldbc/ldbc_snb_datagen
5 http://kdd.di.unito.it/privacyawareness
6 The data collection/storage and processing protocols have been approved by the Law
Office of our institution.
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Table 1: Some datasets characteristics
Dataset #nodes #edges Avg. deg. Avg. CC
SN10K 9,226 183,004 39.671 0.160
SN50K 42,969 1,233,281 57.403 0.113
FB75K 75,193 1,377,672 36.644 0.613
Figure 4 presents their degree distribution. All graphs used in the experiments
are considered as undirected.
4.2 Intrinsic risk estimation
The intrinsic privacy risk defined in Section 3.2 requires the availability of
the privacy policy settings decided by each user or, alternatively, it can be
inferred by the actual social activity of the users. However, this information is
often missing (some social networking platforms implements very basic privacy
policies), unreliable (e.g., some users often set privacy settings lazily) or simply
not available (not provided by social platform API’s). This is a major issue
for security and complex network scientists as well: the privacy settings of
users strongly influences the way information is propagated across the network.
Moreover, knowing the attitude of users toward privacy is crucial to understand
whether (and to whom) a user is willing to share a post/link. Last but not
the least, privacy attitude is the first factor contributing to determining the
privacy risk of users.
As a first experiment, we try to estimate the intrinsic privacy risk using
the only local information often largely available in social networks: the de-
gree of a user node (i.e., the number of friends in Facebook or followers in
asymmetric social networks such as Twitter or Instagram). It is worth noting
that there is no need to access the entire social network in order to know the
degree of a node. To this purpose all the participants in the online experi-
ments described in the previous section were contacted for an online survey.
The participants had to indicate to which extent they were willing to disclose
five different topics (job, relationship status, vacations, political views, per-
sonal life). Possible answers were: visible to no one, to close friends only, to
friends except acquaintances, to all friends, to all friends of friends, visible to
everyone on Facebook. The topics were proposed in form of direct questions
(see Table 2) with different degree of sensitivity. In winter 2015/2016, 101 out
of 185 participants answered all questions of the survey. We used the answers
to fill the 101 × 5 response matrix R (see Section 3.2). Entries in R take
values in {0, . . . , 5}, where rij = 0 means that participant vi does not want
to disclose information about question Qj , rij = 1 means that participant vi
is willing to make information related to Qj available to close friends and so
on. Finally, we computed the intrinsic privacy risk of all 101 participants ac-
cording to Equation 11 described in Section 3.2. Consequently, for each of the
101 volunteers, we have the node degree and the true privacy score computed
Network-aware Privacy Risk Estimation in Online Social Networks 17
Table 2: The five questions (and related topics) of our online survey
Question Question text Topic
Q1 Which people would you like to tell that you have
just changed job?
job
Q2 If your relationship status changed, which friends
would you like to tell?
relationship status
Q3 After a nice holiday, which friends would you share
your photos with?
vacations
Q4 With whom would you like to share a comment on
current affairs/politics?
political views
Q5 With whom would you like to share your mood or
something personal that happened to you?
personal life
according to (Liu and Terzi, 2010). Since we want to model the behavior of
the intrinsic risk according to the degree, we build graph such that the x-axis
represents the node degrees, while the y-axis is proportional to the intrinsic
risk associated to each node degree. Consequently, for each participant vi, we
associate a point (xi, yi) in the graph, where xi = deg(vi) and yi =
ρp(vi)∑
vi
ρp(vi)
,
where ρp(vi) is the intrinsic risk associated to user vi and computed according
to Equation 11.
In order to infer the correct distribution function fitting the set of (xi, yi)
points, we analyze the Skewness-Kurtosis plot (Cullen and Frey, 1999) us-
ing the approach described in (Delignette-Muller and Dutang, 2015) on our
sample. Skewness is a measure of symmetry, or more precisely, the lack of
symmetry, while Kurtosis is a measure of whether the data are heavy-tailed
or light-tailed relative to a normal distribution. The obtained plot suggests
that the best two candidate distribution families are Gamma and Weibull.
Hence, we use the maximum likelihood estimation method to fit our data to
both Gamma and Weibull distribution and analyze the resulting empirical and
theoretical PDF (probability distribution function), CDF (cumulative distri-
bution function), P-P (Probability-Probability) and Q-Q (quantile-quantile)
plots (see Figure 5). The two sets of plots are almost identical, but the Gamma
distribution seems to fit slightly better our data than Weibull distribution.
This is also confirmed by the values obtained by applying the Akaike informa-
tion criterion (Akaike, 1974) (respectively 12982.52 and 12996.07 for Gamma
and Weibull). Consequently, we retain the Γ (k, θ) (Gamma) distribution with
the shape and scale parameters estimated by the maximum likelihood method
(k=2.2989 and θ=169.9461).
According to this choice, the estimated intrinsic privacy risk of a user vi is
given by:
γp(vi, k, θ) = γ (deg(vi); k, θ) =
1
Γ (k)θ2
× deg(vi)k−1 × e−
deg(vi)
θ (12)
where deg(vi) is the degree of node/user vi, γ(deg(vi); k, θ) is the probability
density function, and Γ (k) is the gamma function Γ (z) for z = k. Since the
mode of a generic distribution Γ (k, θ) is given by (k−1)θ, the maximum value
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Fig. 5: Distribution plots showing the agreement between the real distribution
and two possible estimations
is known. Hence, our measure (that we name Γ -Score) can be easily normalized
and is given by
Γ -Score(vi) = γp(vi, k, θ) =
γp(vi, k, θ)
γ((k − 1)θ; k, θ) (13)
Notice that, if the social graph were directed, one should take into account the
indegree deg−(vi) of each node vi.
We can try to provide a practical explanation to the particular shape (given
by parameter k) of the distribution (see the top-left plot in Figure 5(a)).
The key of the interpretation comes from the typical user experience in social
networks. Let us consider a user who has just joined a social platform. At
the very beginning of her cybersocial experience, she will probably have very
few followers/friends and a weak social activity (few published posts/pictures
and other content). The more she adds new connections, the more she gets
involved in the cybersocial environment and is eager to publish new (possibly
sensitive) content, being more exposed to privacy leakage. However, when the
number of friends becomes large, according to well established sociological and
anthropological theories (Roberts et al., 2009; Dunbar, 2016), many links are
likely to be weak (i.e., they represent sporadic online and offline interactions)
and the user starts to be more conscious about the leakage risks concerning
her and her friends’ privacy. When the number of user’s connection is very
high (Facebook allows a maximum of 5,000 friends), privacy is unlikely to
be an issue: people with such large ego-networks are popular personalities or
celebrities that usually publish posts of general interest or like/share content
from other popular social profiles.
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Additionally, the particular estimation of parameter θ may also be ex-
plained intuitively. First, notice that lower values of θ result in lower values of
the mode and a shrunk bell shape7, i.e., the maximum value of the Γ -Score is
reached with a low number of friends. Conversely, for higher values of θ, the
maximum value of the Γ -Score is reached with a higher number of friends, and
the bell is larger. In our experimental study, we obtain θ = 169.9461, and it
can be observed that this value is not far from 150, a salient and well-known
number in sociology. It corresponds to the Dunbar’s number (Roberts et al.,
2009), i.e., the cognitive limit to the number of individuals with whom one
can maintain stable social relationships. Even more interestingly, our θ is very
close to half the average number of Facebook friends, which is reported to be
338 for adult users8. These findings seem to confirm that our estimation is
founded on solid bases, despite its simplicity.
4.2.1 Effects of the biased sampling
As a results of our particular recruitment campaign, our sample is biased to-
wards highly educated people. In fact, from Figure 3(c) it turns out that most
respondents own a University diploma or a higher degree. To assess the im-
pact of this bias on our experiment, we first measure the mean and standard
deviation of the intrinsic privacy risk (computed according to Equation 11)
in each of the following three sub-populations: people owning at most a high
school diploma (HS), people with a University or College degree (UNI), and
people owning a Ph.D. or another postgraduate degree (PHD). The computed
means show slight differences among the three groups: 2.6110± 0.6069 for the
HS group, 2.1970 ± 0.8482 for the UNI group, and 2.3466 ± 0.8710 for the
PHD group. Thus, we observe that there exists no proportionality between
education degree and intrinsic privacy risk. In addition, to assess the statisti-
cal significance of these differences, we perform an unpaired two-tailed t-test
for unequal sample sizes. We used the Benjamini–Hochberg correction pro-
cedure to controls the false discovery rate (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995).
The results clearly indicate (p > 0.1 in all tests) that the null hypothesis that
the P-Scores are drawn from the same distribution cannot be rejected: the
differences are not statistically significant. Consequently, we can reasonably
conclude that the level of education is unlikely to constitute a major bias in
our experiment.
4.3 Results on simulated networks
In Section 3.1 we have introduced our score that measures the privacy risk of
users according to the characteristics of their subnetworks. Here, we investigate
experimentally to what extent it is a good estimate of the objective privacy risk
of the users. To this purpose, we conducted several experiments involving the
7 The typical shape of the Gamma distribution is a skewed bell.
8 http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/03/6-new-facts-about-facebook/
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Fig. 6: Quality index I based on Spearman’s correlation computed once be-
tween the network-aware privacy score and the intrinsic privacy risk and once
between the network-aware privacy score and the eigenvector centrality of
nodes.
two simulated networks (SN10K and SN50K) as follows. First we compute the
intrinsic privacy risk of each node using the Γ -Score (see Section 4.2) according
to the following strategy. First, the intrinsic risk of each node vi is generated
randomly from a Gaussian distribution N(µ, σ2) with µ = γp(vi, k, θ) and
σ2 = 1.0, where θ ∈ [50, 3000] and k = 2.2989 (as computed in Section 4.2).
Then, for each experimental setting we compute the network-aware privacy
score using the power-iteration method (Golub and van der Vorst, 2000) to
solve Equation 2 (see Section 3.1). The number of iterations is set to 100. We
repeat the experiments for varying values of the damping factor d in the inter-
val [0.05, 0.95]. We then measured the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient
(Spearman, 1904) between the intrinsic privacy risk and the network-aware
privacy score (NetP-Score).
The Spearman’s rank coefficient assesses monotonic relationships between
two series of values. Given a set of n objects X = xi . . . xn and two functions
f : X → R and g : X → R, the Spearman’s coefficient is computed as:
ρ = 1− 6×
∑n
i=1 (rankf (xi)− rankg(xi))2
n(n2 − 1) (14)
where rankf (xi) and rankg(xi) are the rank of object xi in the two series of
function values computed for X. It measures the correlation between the two
rankings of the same set of objects and its values range between −1 (when the
rankings are maximally inversely correlated) and +1 (for the maximum posi-
tive rank correlation). The significance of the rank correlation can be assessed
by verifying whether the null hypothesis (i.e., that ρ is not significantly dif-
ferent from zero) can be rejected. Since the quantity t = ρ
√
(n− 2)/(1− ρ2)
is distributed approximately as the Student t-distribution with n− 2 degrees
of freedom, the null hypothesis can be verified by performing the well-known
two-tailed t-test.
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We denote the Spearman ρ between the intrinsic privacy risk and the
network-aware privacy score with ρs. To achieve significant results, we run
each experiment 30 times. Moreover, to investigate the ability of considering
the network topology in the computation of the privacy score, we measured
the Spearman’s correlation between the network-aware privacy score and the
eigenvector centrality (Newman, 2010) of each node. We use ρc to denote this
measure. Finally, we compute a quality index taking into account both ρs
and ρc as I = [(1 + ρs)(1 + ρc)] /4. This index takes values in [0, 1] and is
maximum (resp. minimum) when both Spearman coefficient are equal to 1
(resp. -1). The goal of this index is to identify a range of parameters values en-
abling the computation of network-aware privacy scores that exhibit a strong
correlation with both the intrinsic privacy risk and the centrality of the nodes.
The average results are reported in Figure 6(a) and 6(b). Noticeably, the
I index values are always high (I > 0.55), even though in the region defined
by the two intervals 0.5 ≤ d ≤ 0.7 and 100 ≤ θ ≤ 300 the quality index reach
its maximum values (around 0.90, meaning that NetP-Score’s are strongly
positively correlated with both the intrinsic risk and the eigenvector central-
ity). It is worth noting that in these experiments the p-values are always very
small (p < 10−15), thus indicating that the results are statistically significant.
4.4 Results on the Facebook graph
We set up a slightly different experiment for the social network retrieved from
Facebook (FB75K). The main difference is that, instead of computing the
Γ -Score for all nodes, for the nodes corresponding to the participants in our
survey we use the P-Score (Liu and Terzi, 2010) computed from the response
matrix R obtained by processing their answers. All other 75, 193− 101 nodes
are handled as described in Section 4.3. The remainder of the experimental
setup is the same as described in Section 4.3. The results are reported in Fig-
ure 6(c), but, differently from the previous setting, the Spearman’s coefficient
is computed only on the set of 101 participants. Contrary to the simulated set-
ting, in this case the network-aware privacy score (NetP-Score) exhibit slightly
smaller quality index w.r.t. the P-Score. It can be observed that, overall, the
quality index I ranges between 0.45 and 0.65. In detail, the average Spear-
man’s correlation between the intrinsic privacy risk and the network-aware
privacy score is 0.1292. This result probably means that, for some users, the
privacy score defined by Liu and Terzi (2010) is not always a good estimate
of their objective privacy risk: the low value of the Spearman’s coefficient
shows that there is a gap between the privacy leakage risk computed by only
leveraging users’ privacy preferences and the real privacy risk which takes into
account the weakness of the network surrounding them. On the other hand,
the network-aware privacy scores computed on the 101 participants are always
positively correlated with their eigenvector centrality, despite their intrinsic
risk. These results confirm our initial claim: to measure the objective privacy
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(a) Intrinsic risk (P-Score) (b) Network-aware score (NetP-Score)
Fig. 7: A snapshot of a small portion of the Facebook graph (FB75K) consisting
of a connected component with 67 participants and their computed intrinsic
risk (left) and network-aware privacy scores (right). Darker nodes have higher
scores (best viewed in color version).
risk, any privacy metric should be contextualized within the social graph by
considering its influence on each user.
4.4.1 Visual inspection of the Facebook graph
In addition to the previous analysis, we also report here an in-depth visual
inspection of a small portion of the Facebook graph (FB75K). To obtain this
portion, we first extract the subgraph consisting of all participants in the
experiment described in Section 4.1 that are directly connected to at least an-
other participant. 74 out of 101 participants are selected in this phase. Then,
we consider the subgraph induced by these 74 nodes, which, in its turn, con-
sists of 163 undirected edges, with an average degree of 4.405 and 4 connected
components. By using the intrinsic privacy risk (P-Score) obtained as speci-
fied in Section 4.2, we compute the network-aware privacy score (NetP-Score)
using Equation 3. Note that, since we only consider a small portion of the
network, the results are different from those obtained in Section 4.4, which are
computed on a more realistic snapshot. However, by recomputing the scores
for this small subgraph, we are able to show some interesting insights. In Fig-
ure 7 we report the largest connected component of this subgraph, consisting
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of 67 nodes and 159 edges. In Figure 7(a) nodes are colored according to their
intrinsic risk (darker nodes corresponds to higher scores). In Figure 7(b), in-
stead, node darkness is proportional to our network-aware privacy score. It
is interesting to notice that, due to the low degree of almost all nodes and
their rather “peripheral” position in the network, the NetP-Scores are lower
than the P-Scores. There are only few exceptions, the most evident of which
is represented by the highlighted node in the two pictures: it consists of a very
central node (its degree is 43 and its eigenvector centrality is the maximum
among all 67 nodes), surrounded by several nodes that exhibit a higher intrin-
sic score. Although real social networks are more complex than that presented
in Figure 7, the outcomes of this visual analysis confirm the importance of
considering the impact of the overall network on individual nodes.
4.5 Reliability of the privacy scores
As a concluding experiment, we study the relationship between the differ-
ent privacy score definitions and the effects of information propagation across
the network. A good privacy score should take into account the amount of
nodes that may potentially access and diffuse some information coming from
other nodes in the same network. For this reason, we perform several Monte
Carlo simulations of an information propagation scenario within the two syn-
thetic networks (SN10K and SN50K) and our snapshot of Facebook (FB75K).
In particular, we adopted the Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR) epidemic
model, a well-studied model that describes the transmission of a disease through
a population. At each step an individual may be susceptible (S) to the disease,
infectious (I) or recovered (R), that is immune to the epidemic. An infectious
individual may infect a susceptible one with an infection probability β, and
convert him into an infectious individual, or recover from the disease with
a recovery probability γ, becoming recovered. The SIR model has been also
applied for modeling the diffusion of information in social networks (Gruhl
et al., 2004). In our experiments, for all nodes we set an infection probability
β = 0.5 and a recovery probability γ = 0.3. Then, we select N seed nodes
that, in turn, are considered as the individuals that start the infection (i.e.,
information diffusion process) and measure the number of nodes (called preva-
lence rate) that are either infected (I) or recovered (R) after each step of the
simulation. For datasets SN10K and SN50K we select N = 100 random nodes,
while for FB75K the seed nodes are the 101 Facebook users that participated
in our online experiment. Finally, for each simulation step we compute the
Spearman’s ρ coefficient between the prevalence rate and the privacy scores
(Γ -Score and NetP-Score for SN10K and SN50K, P-Score (Liu and Terzi, 2010)
and NetP-Score for FB75K). Parameters d and θ for the simulated networks
are set according to the best results obtained in the previous experiments
(see Section 4.3), while for the Facebook networks θ is set according to Sec-
tion 4.2 (the damping factor is the same as for the simulated networks). The
results are reported in Figure 8 (parameter settings are given in the captions).
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Fig. 8: Spearman’s correlation computed once between the intrinsic privacy
risk (P-Score or Γ -Score) and the total number of infected nodes (prevalence)
and once between the network-aware privacy score (NetP-Score) and the total
number of infected nodes (prevalence). In all the experiments p < 0.005 (worst
value) except for the P-Score (Liu and Terzi, 2010) in FB75K (p > 0.3).
As expected, our NetP-Score shows a better privacy leakage estimation than
the Γ -Score (see Figure 8(a) and 8(b)). However, the most interesting result
concerns the Facebook network (Figure 8(c)): in this case, in fact, the gap
between the P-Score’s ρ and our network-aware score’s ρ in the very first iter-
ations is significantly large. Assuming that the P-Score correctly measures the
privacy risk based on users’ privacy preferences, a possible explanation is that
the users underestimate their centrality within the network. Undoubtedly, by
construction, our Facebook snapshot cannot be considered a statistically valid
sample of the entire Facebook graph, but the huge difference in terms of cor-
relation with the prevalence rate confirms that privacy leakage metrics should
not ignore the context in which the users operate within the social network.
5 Conclusions and future work
With the final goal of supporting users’ privacy awareness in online social net-
works, we have proposed a context-aware definition of privacy score, inspired
by Pagerank. This measure, as shown in our experiments, is a good estimate
of the objective privacy risk of the users. Moreover we have also inferred ex-
perimentally a new intrinsic privacy risk score that estimates well the real user
attitude towards privacy. The results highlight the necessity of incorporating
privacy measure computation within any domain-specific or general-purpose
social media and networking platforms. Additionally, the low computational
requirements of our measure would not affect the responsiveness of social plat-
forms, and can be of inspiration for the design of privacy-enhancing social net-
working components, in compliance with the principles of Privacy by Design
(Cavoukian, 2012).
As future work we plan to better define our intrinsic privacy score by
conducting an extensive experimental campaign involving more online social
network users. Furthermore, the policy-based definition that we adopted to
compute the intrinsic privacy risk is limited to a well-defined set of topics or
aspects (e.g. work status, photo albums, relationship status). However, topic
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detection techniques can be applied to natural language posts or pictures to
understand their contents, as proposed by Song et al. (2018). A further refine-
ment of this work, will consists in directly inferring the sensitivity of posted
items by leveraging topic modeling, natural language processing techniques,
and text categorization algorithms. Finally, an interesting research question
deserving further investigation is whether, in general, aware users are mostly
surrounded by aware users and vice-versa. Although some effects related to
homophily — the theory according to which similar nodes may be more likely
to attach to each other than dissimilar ones (McPherson et al., 2001) — may
exist, the role of privacy attitude in determining social network ties is probably
involved in more complex phenomena.
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